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Abstract
We study the efficiency of mechanisms for allocating a divisible resource. Given scalar signals
submitted by all users, such a mechanism decides the fraction of the resource that each user will receive
and a payment that will be collected from her. Users are self-interested and aim to maximize their utility
(defined as their value for the resource fraction they receive minus their payment). Starting with the
seminal work of Johari and Tsitsiklis [8], a long list of papers studied the price of anarchy (in terms of the
social welfare — the total users’ value) of resource allocation mechanisms for a variety of allocation and
payment rules. Here, we further assume that each user has a budget constraint that invalidates strategies
that yield a payment that is higher than the user’s budget. This subtle assumption, which is arguably
more realistic, constitutes the traditional price of anarchy analysis meaningless as the set of equilibria
may change drastically and their social welfare can be arbitrarily far from optimal. Instead, we study the
price of anarchy using the liquid welfare benchmark that measures efficiency taking budget constraints
into account. We show a tight bound of 2 on the liquid price of anarchy of the well-known Kelly
mechanism and prove that this result is essentially best possible among all multi-user resource allocation
mechanisms. This comes in sharp contrast to the no-budget setting where there are mechanisms that
considerably outperform Kelly in terms of social welfare and even achieve full efficiency. In our proofs,
we exploit the particular structure of worst-case games and equilibria, which also allows us to design
(nearly) optimal two-player mechanisms by solving simple differential equations.
1 Introduction
Resource allocation is an ubiquitous task in computing systems and often sets algorithmic challenges to
their design. As such, resource allocation problems have received much attention by the algorithmic com-
munity for decades. The recent emergence of large-scale distributed systems with non-cooperative users
that compete for access to scarce resources has led to game-theoretic treatments of resource allocation.
In this paper, we study a particular simple class of resource allocation mechanisms that aim to distribute a
divisible resource (such as bandwidth of a communication link, CPU time, storage space, etc.) by auctioning
it off to different users as follows. Each user is asked to submit a scalar signal. Given the submitted signals,
the mechanism decides the fraction of the resource that will be allocated to each user, as well as the payment
that will be received from each of them. A typical example is a mechanism that has been proposed by Kelly
[10] (henceforth called the Kelly mechanism; see also [11]), according to which the fraction of the resource
allocated to each user is proportional to the user’s signal and the signal itself is her payment.
The users are self-interested. Following the standard modeling assumptions in the related literature, the
value of each user for a resource fraction is given by a private valuation function. The above definition of
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resource allocation mechanisms allows the users to act strategically in the sense that the signal they select
to submit is such that their utility (value for the fraction of the resource they receive minus payment) is
maximized. Naturally, this behavior defines a strategic game among the users, who act as players. Soon
after the definition of the Kelly mechanism, a series of papers studied the existence and uniqueness of
pure Nash equilibria (snapshots of player strategies, in which the signal of each player maximizes her own
utility) of the induced games [6, 13, 15] and quantified their inefficiency [8] using the notion of the price of
anarchy [12].
In particular, Johari and Tsitsiklis [8] used the social welfare (i.e., the total value of the players for
their received fraction of the resource) as an efficiency benchmark and proved that the social welfare at any
equilibrium is at least 3/4 times the optimal social welfare. This translates into a price of anarchy bound
of 4/3, which is tight. The paper of Johari and Tsitsiklis [8] sparked subsequent research on other resource
allocation mechanisms, that use different (non-proportional) allocation rules or payments.
A first apparent question was whether improved price of anarchy bounds are possible by changing the
allocation function, but keeping the simple pay-your-signal (or PYS, for short) payment rule. Sanghavi and
Hajek [19] showed that no PYS mechanism has price of anarchy better than 8/7, designed an allocation
function that achieves this bound for two players, and provided strong experimental evidence that a slightly
inferior bound holds for arbitrarily many players. Surprisingly, full efficiency at equilibria (i.e., a price of
anarchy equal to 1) is possible via different allocation/payment functions. This discovery was made in three
independent papers by Maheswaran and Basar [16], Yang and Hajek [21], and Johari and Tsitsiklis [9]. The
mechanism in [16] uses proportional allocation (but a different payment; see Section 2 for its description),
while the mechanisms in [9, 21] are adaptations of the well-known VCG paradigm (see also the survey by
Johari [7] on these results).
Our focus in the current paper is on the —arguably, more realistic— setting, in which each player has a
private budget that constrains the payments that she can afford and, consequently, narrows her strategy space.
As resource allocation mechanisms do not have direct access to budgets, budget constraints can restrict the
set of equilibria so that their social welfare is extremely low compared to the optimal social welfare, which
in turn is not related to player strategies, payments, or budgets. An efficiency benchmark that is suitable
for budget-constrained players is known as liquid welfare (introduced by Dobzinski and Paes Leme [4]
and, independently, by Syrgkanis and Tardos [20] who call it effective welfare) and is obtained by slightly
changing the definition of the social welfare, taking budgets into account. Informally, the liquid welfare is
the total value of the players for the resource fraction they receive, with the value of each player capped by
her budget. Following the recent paper [1], we use the term liquid price of anarchy (and abbreviate it as
LPoA) to refer to the price of anarchy with respect to the liquid welfare, i.e., the ratio between the optimal
liquid welfare of a game induced by a resource allocation mechanism and the worst liquid welfare over all
equilibria of the game.
Our results and techniques. We aim to explore all resource allocation mechanisms and find the mech-
anism with the best possible LPoA. Our results suggest a drastically different picture compared to the
no-budget setting. First, the analogue of full efficiency is not achievable; we show a lower bound of 2−1/n
on the LPoA of any n-player resource allocation mechanism (under standard technical assumptions for
player valuations and mechanism characteristics; see Section 2). The Kelly mechanism is proved to have an
almost best possible LPoA of exactly 2. In contrast, the mechanism of Sanghavi and Hajek [19] (henceforth
called SH) has an LPoA of 3. Improved bounds are possible for two players. We design the two-player
PYS resource allocation mechanism E2-PYS that has an LPoA of 1.792; this bound is optimal among a
very broad class of mechanisms. We also design the two-player mechanism E2-SR that achieves an almost
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optimal LPoA bound of at most 1.529; this mechanism uses different payments. See Table 1 for a summary
of our results.
Mechanism LPoA Statement Comment
Kelly 2 Theorem 5.1 Tight bound. Almost optimal among all n-player
mechanisms (see Theorem 3.1)
SH 3 Theorem 5.2 Tight bound (Theorem 5.3)
E2-PYS 1.792 Theorem 6.1 Optimal among all two-player PYS mechanisms
with concave allocation functions (Theorem 6.2)
E2-SR 1.529 Theorem 6.3 Almost optimal among all two-player mechanisms
(see Theorem 3.1)
Table 1: Summary of our LPoA bounds.
Our results exploit a particular structure of worst-case (in terms of LPoA) games and their equilibria. We
prove that for every resource allocation mechanism, the worst-case LPoA is obtained at instances in which
players have affine valuation functions. In addition, all players besides one have finite budgets and play
strategies that imply payments that are either zero or equal to their budget, while a single player has infinite
budget and a signal that nullifies the derivative of her utility. Compared to an analogous characterization
for the no-budget case (with linear valuation functions and player signals that all nullify their utility deriva-
tives), first observed by Johari and Tsitsiklis [8] for the Kelly mechanism and later extended to all resource
allocation mechanisms, the structure in our characterization is much richer and the proof is considerably
more complicated. The characterization contains so much information that the LPoA bounds follow rather
easily; the extreme example is the proof of our best LPoA bound of 2 for the Kelly mechanism which is only
a few lines long. It can also be used in the design of new mechanisms; for example, the design and analysis
of our two-player mechanisms E2-PYS and E2-SR follow by simple first-order differential equations, which
would never have been identified without our characterization. And, furthermore, under assumptions about
the resource allocation mechanisms (e.g., concave allocations and convex payments), the LPoA bound is
automatically proved to be tight without providing any explicit lower bound instance.
Other related work. As an efficiency benchmark, the liquid welfare has been studied recently in different
contexts such as in the design of truthful mechanisms [4, 14] and in the analysis of combinatorial Walrasian
equilibria with budgets [5]. In the context of the price of anarchy, it was considered recently in simultaneous
first price auctions in [1].
Our previous paper [2] has been the first to prove that the liquid price of anarchy of the Kelly mechanism
is constant. In particular, we showed LPoA upper and lower bounds of 2.78 and 2, respectively. The lower
bound is essentially proved again here (see Theorem 5.1) with a completely different and more interesting
technique. Christodoulou et al. [3] improved the LPoA upper bound to 2.618 and extended the results to
more general settings involving multiple resources. Prior to these two papers, Syrgkanis and Tardos [20]
proved that the social welfare at equilibria of the Kelly mechanism is at most a constant factor away from the
optimal liquid welfare. In contrast to the analysis techniques in the current paper, the analysis of the Kelly
mechanism in [2, 3, 20] is closer in spirit to the smoothness template (see [17, 18]) and is based on bounding
the utility of each player by the utility she would have when deviating to appropriate signal strategies. Their
results hold for more general equilibrium concepts such as coarse-correlated or Bayes-Nash equilibria. Our
LPoA bounds in the current paper hold specifically for pure Nash equilibria but are superior and tight.
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Roadmap. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We begin with definitions and notation in Section
2. Our lower bound on the LPoA of any resource allocation mechanism appears in Section 3. Section 4 is
devoted to proving the structural characterization of worst-case resource allocation games and equilibria.
Then, in Section 5 we present tight bounds on the liquid price of anarchy for the Kelly and SH mechanisms.
In Section 6, we present our two-player mechanisms E2-PYS and E2-SR. We conclude with open problems
a discussion on possible extensions in Section 7.
2 Definitions, notation, and examples
We consider a single divisible resource of unit size that is distributed among n users by a resource allocation
mechanism M . The mechanism M consists of
• an allocation function gM : Rn≥0 → Q ∪ 0, where Q = {d ∈ [0, 1]n :
∑n
i=1 di = 1} is the unit
n-simplex and 0 = (0, ..., 0), and
• a payment function pM : Rn≥0 → Rn≥0,
and works as follows. Each user i submits a signal si ∈ R≥0, and the mechanism M allocates a fraction of
gMi (s) of the resource to each user i and asks her for a payment of p
M
i (s), where s = (s1, ..., sn) denotes
the vector formed by all signals.
Some important properties of allocation and payment functions are as follows. First, they are anony-
mous: any permutation of the entries of the input signal vector results in the same permutation of the output.
So, all users get equal resource shares and are asked equal payments when they submit identical signals.
The mechanism does not allocate any fraction and does not ask for any payment from a user that submits
a zero signal. By convention, when some user is the only one with a non-zero signal, she gets the whole
resource and is asked a payment of zero. Let (y, s−i) denote the signal vector in which user i has a signal of
y and the remaining users have their signals as in s. Viewed as univariate functions (of variable y), functions
gMi (y, s−i) and p
M
i (y, s−i) are increasing and differentiable in R≥0 (with the exception of (y, s−i) = 0).
Each user i has
• a monotone non-decreasing, concave, and differentiable1 valuation function vi : [0, 1] → R≥0; vi(x)
represents the value user i has for a resource fraction of x;
• a budget ci ∈ R≥0 ∪ {+∞}, which restricts (i.e., upper-bounds) her payment to the mechanism.
Her utility from the mechanism is defined as the value she gets for the fraction she is given minus her
payment, i.e.,
uMi (s) = vi
(
gMi (s)
)− pMi (s).
To capture the fact that budgets impose hard constraints to the users, we technically assume that uMi (s) =
−∞ when pMi (s) > ci.
The users act strategically as utility maximizers and engage as players into a strategic resource allocation
game GM that is induced by mechanism M . A (pure Nash) equilibrium is a signal vector s such that, when
viewed as a univariate function of variable y, uMi (y, s−i) is maximized for y = si, i.e., no player can
increase her utility by unilaterally deviating to submitting a different signal. We denote by eq(GM ) the set
1We remark that our results hold for semi-differentiable valuation functions as well. However, the proof of our characterization
(Lemma 4.1) is technically more involved. So, the differentiability assumption keeps the exposition simple.
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of all equilibria of game GM . By the definition and properties of the allocation and payment functions,
the signal vector 0 cannot be an equilibrium as (by the conventions mentioned above) any player has the
incentive to unilaterally deviate and get the whole resource without paying anything. We use Xn as an
abbreviation of the set Rn≥0 \ {0}.
Due to the budget constraints, we have three different cases for the strategy of player i at an equilibrium
s ∈ eq(GM ) (assuming a non-trivial budget ci > 0) and for the corresponding value of the derivative of her
utility. In particular, the derivative ∂u
M
i (y,s−i)
∂y
∣∣∣
y=si
is equal to zero in case si is such that 0 < pMi (s) < ci,
non-positive in case si = 0, and non-negative in case si is such that pMi (s) = ci. Note that nullification of
the utility derivative does not necessarily imply maximization of utility.
We are interested in studying the effect of strategic behavior to the efficiency of a mechanism. An
efficiency benchmark that has been used extensively in the literature is the social welfare. For an allocation
d ∈ Q ∪ 0 of a resource allocation game GM , the social welfare is defined as
SW(d,GM ) =
n∑
i=1
vi(di),
where n is the number of players in GM and vi is the valuation function of player i. Then, the inefficiency
of equilibria of game GM can be measured by its price of anarchy which is defined as
PoA(GM ) = sup
s∈eq(GM )
SW∗(GM )
SW(gM (s),GM ) ,
where SW∗(GM ) denotes the maximum social welfare over all allocations of GM .
However, the definition of the social welfare does not take into account the possibly finite budgets that
the players may have. Therefore, we instead use the liquid welfare as our efficiency benchmark. The liquid
welfare of an allocation d is defined as
LW(d,GM ) =
n∑
i=1
min{vi(di), ci},
where ci is the budget of player i. Clearly, when players have no budget constraints, the liquid welfare
coincides with the social welfare. The liquid price of anarchy of a resource allocation game GM is then
defined as
LPoA(GM ) = sup
s∈eq(GM )
LW∗(GM )
LW(gM (s),GM ) ,
where LW∗(GM ) denotes the maximum liquid welfare over all allocations of game GM . We use the over-
loaded term LPoA(M) to denote the liquid price of anarchy of the resource allocation mechanism M . This
is defined as the maximum (or, more formally, the supremum) liquid price of anarchy over all games that
are induced by mechanism M .
Examples of resource allocation mechanisms. Let us devote some space to the definition of some well-
known mechanisms from the literature. An important class of resource allocation mechanisms is that of
pay-your-signal mechanisms (PYS, for short). When at least two players submit non-zero signals, a PYS
mechanism charges each player i a payment equal to the signal si that she submits. Otherwise, PYS mech-
anisms follow the general convention that we have defined at the beginning of Section 2, and do not charge
any payment to any player.
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The most popular PYS mechanism is the Kelly mechanism that was introduced in [10]. This mechanism
allocates the resource proportionally to the players’ signals (this is why it is also known as the proportional
allocation mechanism in the related literature), i.e.,
g
Kelly
i (s) =
si∑n
j=1 sj
.
The Kelly mechanism has played a central role in the related literature; for the no-budget setting, Johari
and Tsitsiklis [8] proved that its price of anarchy is 4/3. In their attempt to design the PYS mechanism with
the lowest possible price of anarchy, Sanghavi and Hajek [19] defined the allocation function
gSHi (s) =
si
max`{s`}
∫ 1
0
∏
j 6=i
(
1− sj
max`{s`} t
)
dt.
We will refer to the PYS mechanism that uses this allocation function as SH. For two players, the allocation
function has a very simple definition as gSH1 (s) =
s1
2s2
when s1 ≤ s2, and gSH1 (s) = 1 − s22s1 otherwise.
Sanghavi and Hajek proved that the two-player version of the SH mechanism has an optimal (among all
PYS mechanisms) price of anarchy of 8/7 and provided experimental evidence that the price of anarchy of
the n-player version is only marginally higher. As we will see later in Section 5, the comparison between
Kelly and SH yields a drastically different result when players have budgets and the liquid welfare is used
as the efficiency benchmark.
Other interesting classes of mechanisms use proportional allocation but different payments. Among
them, a mechanism defined by Maheswaran and Basar [16] uses the class of payment functions
pMi (s) =
∑
j 6=i
sj
 · ∫ si
0
hM (t+
∑
j 6=i sj)
(t+
∑
j 6=i sj)2
dt,
where hM : R≥0 → R≥0 is an increasing function (such as hM (z) = z; [16] suggests several other choices
for hM ). These mechanisms have the remarkable property of full efficiency at equilibria in the no-budget
setting (i.e., they have price of anarchy equal to 1). Independently from [16], Johari and Tsitsiklis [9] and
Yang and Hajek [21] present resource allocation mechanisms that achieve full efficiency in the no-budget
setting as well. All these mechanisms can be thought of as adaptations of the well-known VCG paradigm.
3 A lower bound for all mechanisms
The fact that the mechanisms in [16, 9, 21] achieve full efficiency seems surprising, as resource allocation
mechanisms do not have direct access to the valuation functions of the players. Still, the definition of these
mechanisms is such that the incentives of the players are fully aligned to the global goal of maximizing the
social welfare. In a sense, these mechanisms manage to achieve access to the valuation functions indirectly.
In contrast, when players have budget constraints, we show below that a liquid price of anarchy equal to 1 is
not possible. This means that resource allocation mechanisms fail to “mine” any kind of information about
the budget values of the players, while budgets affect the strategic behavio of the players crucially.
Theorem 3.1. Every n-player resource allocation mechanism has liquid price of anarchy at least 2− 1/n.
Proof. Let M be any n-player resource allocation mechanism that uses an allocation function gM and a
payment function pM . Let s = (s1, ..., sn) be an equilibrium of the game GM1 induced by M for players
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with valuations vi(x) = x and budgets ci = +∞, for every i ∈ [n]. Assume that the allocation returned by
M at this equilibrium is d = (d1, ..., dn). Since all players have the same valuation function and budget, the
liquid (or social) welfare at equilibrium is optimal and, hence, LPoA(GM1 ) = 1.
Recall that, for every signal vector y = (y1, ..., yn), the utility of player i is defined as uMi (y) =
vi(g
M
i (y))− pMi (y). Now, let i∗ = arg mini di (hence, di∗ ≤ 1/n) and consider the game GM2 where each
player i 6= i∗ has the modified valuation function v˜i(x) = di + x and budget c˜i = di, while player i∗ is as
in GM1 (see Figure 1). Observe that the modified utility of player i 6= i∗ as a function of a signal vector y is
now u˜Mi (y) = v˜i(g
M
i (y))− pMi (y) = uMi (y) + di. Also, since the utility of player i 6= i∗ is non-negative
at the equilibrium s of game GM1 , we have that pMi (s) ≤ di = c˜i, meaning that player i can also afford this
payment in game GM2 . Hence, s is an equilibrium in GM2 as well (and, again, M returns the same allocation
d).
Its liquid welfare is
∑
i min{v˜i(di), c˜i} =
∑
i di = 1 while the optimal liquid welfare is at least 1 +∑
i 6=i∗ di, achieved at the allocation according to which the whole resource is given to player i
∗. Hence, we
conclude that the liquid price of anarchy of M is LPoA(M) ≥ LPoA(GM2 ) ≥ 1 +
∑
i 6=i∗ di = 2 − di∗ ≥
2− 1/n, as desired.
0 di∗ 1
0
di∗
1
vi∗(x) = x
0 di 1
0
di
1
2di
vi(x) = x
v˜i(x) = di + x
Figure 1: A graphical representation of the games used in the proof of Theorem 3.1. The two figures depict
the valuation functions of players i∗ and i 6= i∗ in games GM1 and GM2 . The blue points (i.e., point (di∗ , di∗)
in the left figure, and points (di, di) and (di, 2di) in the right figure) represent the equilibrium in both games,
and the optimal allocation in game GM1 . The optimal allocation in GM2 is represented by the red points (i.e.,
point (1, 1) in the left figure and point (0, di) in the right one).
4 The structure of worst-case games and equilibria
In this section, we prove our structural characterization. Given an n-player resource allocation mechanism
M (with allocation and payment functions gM and pM , respectively), signal vector s ∈ Xn, and an integer
j ∈ [n], define the n-player game GM (s, j) as follows. Every player has the affine valuation function
v˜i(z) = λ
M
i (s) · z + κMi (s) and budget c˜i, where
λMi (s) =
(
∂gMi (y, s−i)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=si
)−1
· ∂p
M
i (y, s−i)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=si
and κMj (s) = 0, c˜j = +∞, and κMi (s) = c˜i = pMi (s) for every player i 6= j.
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In the following, we show that the games defined in this way are in a sense extreme in terms of the liquid
price of anarchy of mechanism M .
Lemma 4.1. Let GM1 be an n-player resource allocation game that is induced by a mechanism M with
LPoA(GM1 ) > 1. Let s ∈ Xn be an equilibrium of GM1 of minimum liquid welfare. Then, there exists integer
i∗ ∈ [n] such that
LPoA(GM1 ) ≤
LW(x˜,GM (s, i∗))
LW(gM (s),GM (s, i∗)) =
∑
i 6=i∗ p
M
i (s) + λ
M
i∗ (s)∑
i 6=i∗ p
M
i (s) + λ
M
i∗ (s) · gMi∗ (s)
,
where x˜ = (x˜1, ..., x˜n) denotes the allocation with x˜i∗ = 1 and x˜i = 0 for i 6= i∗.
Proof. Consider an n-player resource allocation game GM1 that is induced by mechanism M . Let vi and ci
be the valuation function and budget of player i, respectively. Let s ∈ Xn be the equilibrium of game GM1
of minimum liquid welfare. We denote by x the optimal allocation in GM1 . Without loss of generality, we
assume that, for every player i, xi = 0 if vi(0) > ci and vi(xi) ≤ ci otherwise, and we relax the allocation
definition to
∑n
i=1 xi ≤ 1; this does not constrain the optimal liquid welfare which is LW(x,GM1 ) =∑
i min{vi(xi), ci}. We use di = gMi (s) for the resource fraction allocated to player i in s; let d =
(d1, ..., dn).
We partition the players into the following three sets:
• Set A consists of players i with vi(di) < ci and signal si such that the derivative of their utility is
equal to 0.
• Set B consists of players i with signal si = 0 (hence, di = 0) and negative utility derivative such that
vi(0) < ci.
• Set Γ consists of players i with signal si such that vi(di) ≥ ci.
First, observe that setsA andB cannot be both empty, since it would then be LW(d,GM1 ) =
∑
i∈[n] ci ≥
LW(x,GM1 ), and the liquid price of anarchy of GM1 would be exactly 1, contradicting the assumption of the
lemma. So, in the following, we assume that one of A and B is non-empty.
Now consider the games GM (s, j) for j ∈ [n] and let i∗ = arg maxj∈A∪B{λMj (s)}. We will show that
LW(d,GM1 ) ≥ LW(d,GM (s, i∗)) (1)
and will furthermore show that the allocation x˜ satisfies
LW(x,GM1 )− LW(x˜,GM (s, i∗)) ≤ LW(d,GM1 )− LW(d,GM (s, i∗)). (2)
In this way (recall that s is the equilibrium of minimum liquid welfare in game GM1 and d is the resulting
allocation), we will have
LPoA(GM1 ) =
LW(x,GM1 )
LW(d,GM1 )
≤ LW(x,G
M
1 )− (LW(x,GM1 )− LW(x˜,GM (s, i∗)))
LW(d,GM1 )− (LW(d,GM1 )− LW(d,GM (s, i∗)))
=
LW(x˜,GM (s, i∗))
LW(d,GM (s, i∗)) =
∑
i 6=i∗ p
M
i (s) + λ
M
i∗ (s)∑
i 6=i∗ p
M
i (s) + λ
M
i∗ (s) · gMi∗ (s)
,
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0 di 1
0
c˜i = p
M
i (s)
vi(di)
ci
vi(z)
v˜i∗(z)
v˜i(z)
i∗ ∈ A
i ∈ A
di∗ = 0 1
c˜i = p
M
i (s) = 0
vi∗(di∗)
ci∗ vi∗(z)
v˜i∗(z)
i∗ ∈ B
i ∈ B
di = 0 1
c˜i = p
M
i (s) = 0
ci
vi(di)
vi(z)
v˜i(z)
i ∈ Γ
case 1
0 di 1
0
c˜i = p
M
i (s)
ci
vi(di)
vi(z)
v˜i(z)
i ∈ Γ
case 2
0 di 1
0
c˜i = p
M
i (s) = ci
vi(di)
vi(z)
v˜i(z)
i ∈ Γ
case 3
Figure 2: Relation between the two games GM1 and GM (s, i∗) that are used in the proof of Lemma 4.1.
In the first two plots, player i is different than i∗ and c˜i∗ is infinite by definition. The dashed line is the
tangent of vi at di. The slope λMi (s) of the affine valuation function of player i in game GM (s, i∗) is
greater than (upper right and middle left plots), equal to (upper left and middle right plots), or smaller than
(lower plot) v′i(di) depending on whether the utility derivative of the player is negative, zero, or positive,
respectively (in particular, these are the three cases identified in the plots for i ∈ Γ). This follows by the
definition of games GM1 and GM (s, i∗) and the fact that, as the utility of player i in game GM1 has derivative
v′i(di)
∂gMi (y,s−i)
∂y
∣∣∣
y=si
− ∂pMi (y,s−i)∂y
∣∣∣
y=si
at equilibrium, the sign of this derivative coincides with the sign
of v′i(di)− λMi (s).
as desired. The inequality follows by (1) and (2). The last equality follows since all players in GM (s, i∗)
besides i∗ have always their value capped by their budget, which is equal to their payment.
Inequality (1) is due to the fact that the contribution of each player to the liquid welfare at s can only
decrease between the two games. Indeed, if player i∗ belongs toB, she has zero value in game GM (s, i∗). If
she belongs to A, then her utility derivative is nullified and, hence, v′i∗(di∗) = λ
M
i∗ (s). Due to the concavity
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of vi, we get vi∗(di∗) ≥ di∗v′i∗(di∗) = di∗λMi∗ (s) = v˜i∗(di∗). Moreover, the contribution of player i 6= i∗ in
LW(d,GM (s, i∗)) is c˜i = pMi (s) which is at most her contribution min{vi(di), ci} in LW(d,GM1 ) since the
payment of player i cannot exceed her budget in GM1 and her utility at equilibrium s is non-negative. See
Figure 2 for a graphical representation of valuation functions and budgets in games GM1 and GM (s, i∗).
Let
δ(i) = min{vi(xi), ci} −min{v˜i(x˜i), c˜i} −min{vi(di), ci}+ min{v˜i(di), c˜i}
denote the contribution of player i to the expression LW(x,GM1 ) − LW(x˜,GM (s, i∗)) − LW(d,GM1 ) +
LW(d,GM (s, i∗)). Then, in order to prove inequality (2) it suffices to prove that∑i δ(i) ≤ 0.
• For player i∗, we have that vi∗(di∗) < ci∗ . Using the inequality vi∗(xi∗) ≤ vi∗(di∗) + v′i∗(di∗)(xi∗ −
di∗) due to the concavity of the valuation function vi∗ and the fact x˜i∗ = 1, we have that
δ(i∗) = min{vi∗(xi∗), ci∗} − λMi∗ (s)x˜i∗ − vi∗(di∗) + λMi∗ (s)di∗
≤ vi∗(xi∗)− λMi∗ (s)− vi∗(di∗) + λMi∗ (s)di∗
≤ v′i∗(di∗)(xi∗ − di∗)− λMi∗ (s) + λMi∗ (s)di∗ .
Now, we observe that (for such observations, we follow the reasoning in the caption of Figure 2) if
player i∗ belongs to A, then λMi∗ (s) = v
′
i∗(di∗), while if she belongs to B, then λ
M
i∗ (s) ≥ v′i∗(di∗) and
di∗ = 0. In any case, we have that v′i∗(di∗)(xi∗ − di∗) ≤ λMi∗ (s)(xi∗ − di∗), and we obtain
δ(i∗) ≤ λMi∗ (s)(xi∗ − 1). (3)
• For all players i 6= i∗, observe that their value is always capped by their budget in GM (s, i∗). For
player i 6= i∗ belonging toA or toB we have that either λMi (s) = v′i(di) (if i ∈ A), or λMi (s) ≥ v′i(di)
and di = 0 (if i ∈ B). Hence, using the concavity of vi and the fact that x˜i = 0, we obtain that
δ(i) ≤ vi(xi)− c˜i − vi(di) + c˜i ≤ vi(di) + λMi (s)(xi − di)− vi(di) ≤ λMi∗ (s)xi, (4)
where the last inequality follows since λMi (s) ≤ λMi∗ (s), due to the definition of player i∗. Otherwise,
if i ∈ Γ, we have
δ(i) = min{vi(xi), ci} − c˜i − ci + c˜i ≤ 0. (5)
Hence, summing over all players, and using inequalities (3), (4) and (5) as well as the fact that
∑
i xi ≤ 1,
we obtain
∑
i δ(i) ≤ 0, and the proof is complete.
We are now ready to prove the main result of this section.
Lemma 4.2. Let M be an n-player resource allocation mechanism with allocation and payment functions
gM and pM , respectively. Then, its liquid price of anarchy is
LPoA(M) ≤ sup
s∈Xn

∑
i≥2 p
M
i (s) + λ
M
1 (s)∑
i≥2 p
M
i (s) + λ
M
1 (s) g
M
1 (s)
: λM1 (s) =
(
∂gM1 (y, s−1)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=s1
)−1
· ∂p
M
1 (y, s−1)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=s1
.
(6)
If, in addition, s ∈ Xn is always an equilibrium of game GM (s, 1), (6) holds with equality.
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Proof. Let weq(GM ) be the set of equilibria of minimum liquid welfare in game GM . Using the definition
of the liquid price of anarchy, Lemma 4.1, and the anonymity of resource allocation mechanisms, we have
LPoA(M) = sup
GM
LPoA(GM ) = sup
GM
sup
s∈weq(GM )
LW∗(GM )
LW(gM (s),GM ) = sups∈Xn
sup
GM :s∈weq(GM )
LW∗(GM )
LW(gM (s),GM )
≤ sup
s∈Xn
max
i∗∈[n]
∑
i 6=i∗ p
M
i (s) + λ
M
i∗ (s)∑
i 6=i∗ p
M
i (s) + λ
M
i∗ (s) g
M
i∗ (s)
= sup
s∈Xn
∑
i≥2 p
M
i (s) + λ
M
1 (s)∑
i≥2 p
M
i (s) + λ
M
1 (s) g
M
1 (s)
.
Now, if s ∈ eq(GM (s, 1)) for every s ∈ Xn, by just considering the games GM (s, 1) induced by mechanism
M , we have
LPoA(M) ≥ sup
s∈Xn
LPoA(GM (s, 1)) ≥ sup
s∈Xn
∑
i≥2 p
M
i (s) + λ
M
1 (s)∑
i≥2 p
M
i (s) + λ
M
1 (s) g
M
1 (s)
and (6) holds with equality. The last inequality follows by comparing the liquid welfare at s to the liquid
welfare of the allocation which gives the whole resource to player 1. Recall that all players besides player 1
have always their value capped by their budget in game GM (s, 1).
Lemma 4.2 is extremely powerful. It says that no game-theoretic reasoning is needed anymore for
proving upper bounds on the LPoA and, instead, all we have to do is to solve the corresponding mathematical
program. Furthermore, it can be used to prove lower bounds on the LPoA without providing any explicit
construction. In this case, we just need to show that the condition s ∈ eq(GM (s, 1)) holds; then the tight
lower bound follows by solving the same mathematical program.
Before we continue with the rest of our results, we define the class C of mechanismsM that use concave
allocation functions gM and convex payment functions pM . Observe that both Kelly and SH (as well as the
E2-PYS mechanism presented in Section 6) are members of this class. With our next lemma, we prove that
the condition s ∈ eq(GM (s, 1)) is satisfied for any C mechanism M . This will allows us to prove lower
bounds in the upcoming sections.
Lemma 4.3. For any n-player resource allocation mechanism M ∈ C and s ∈ Xn, s ∈ eq(GM (s, 1)).
Proof. Consider any C mechanism M that uses a concave allocation function gM and a convex payment
function pM . By the definition of game GM (s, 1), the utility of any player i, as a function of her signal y, is
uMi (y, s−i) = λ
M
i (s) · gMi (y, s−i) + κMi (s)− pMi (y, s−i) and its derivative is
∂uMi (y, s−i)
∂y
= λMi (s)
∂gMi (y, s−i)
∂y
− ∂p
M
i (y, s−1)
∂y
.
Observe that, by the definition of λMi (s), the signal si nullifies the utility derivative of player i, and since
∂2uMi (y, s−i)
∂y2
= λMi (s)
∂2gMi (y, s−i)
∂y2
− ∂
2pMi (y, s−1)
∂y2
≤ 0,
this signal actually maximizes the player’s utility.
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5 Pay-your-signal mechanisms
In this section, we will use Lemma 4.2 to prove tight bounds on the liquid price of anarchy of the Kelly and
SH mechanisms. Our LPoA bounds are 2 for Kelly (Theorem 5.1) and 3 for SH (Theorems 5.2 and 5.3).
Recall that both of these mechanisms belong to class C and, by Lemma 4.3, the condition s ∈ eq(GM (s, 1))
is satisfied.
Theorem 5.1. The liquid price of anarchy of the Kelly mechanism is 2.
Proof. Let s ∈ Xn and C =
∑
i≥2 si. Since Kelly is PYS, we have that
∑
i≥2 p
Kelly
i (s) = C and
∂p
Kelly
1 (y,s−1)
∂y = 1. Recall that the allocation function is g
Kelly
1 (y, s−1) =
y
y+C , which gives
∂g
Kelly
1 (y,s−1)
∂y =
C
(y+C)2
. Also, since the mechanism belongs to class C, by Lemma 4.3, we have that s ∈ eq(GKelly(s, 1)).
Hence, λKelly1 (s) = (s1 + C)
2/C and Lemma 4.2 yields
LPoA(Kelly) = sup
s1,C≥0
C + (s1 + C)
2/C
C + (s1 + C)s1/C
= sup
s1,C≥0
2C2 + 2s1C + s
2
1
C2 + s1C + s21
= sup
s1,C≥0
(
2− s
2
1
C2 + s1C + s21
)
= 2,
as desired.
Our proof for the SH mechanism is slightly more involved.
Theorem 5.2. The liquid price of anarchy of the SH mechanism is at most 3.
Proof. We will use Lemma 4.2 and will upper-bound the ratio in the RHS of (6) by 3. Define C =
∑
i≥2 si.
First, let s ∈ Xn with s1 < max` s`. Let arg max` s` = i∗ 6= 1. Then, by the definition of SH and the
definition of λSH1 (s) in (6), we have
λSH1 (s) =
si∗∫ 1
0
∏
i≥2
(
1− sisi∗ t
)
dt
(7)
and using the Bernoulli inequality stating that 1− γt ≥ (1− t)γ for t ≤ 1 and γ ∈ [0, 1], (7) yields
λSH1 (s) ≤
si∗∫ 1
0
∏
i≥2 (1− t)
si
si∗ dt
=
si∗∫ 1
0 (1− t)
C
si∗ dt
= si∗ + C.
Since SH is PYS,
∑
i≥2 p
SH
i (s) = C. Using this observation together with the last inequality, we obtain∑
i≥2 p
SH
i (s) + λ
SH
1 (s)∑
i≥2 p
SH
i (s) + λ
SH
1 (s) g
SH
1 (s)
≤ 2C + si∗
C
≤ 3. (8)
The inequalities follow since λSH1 (s) g
SH
1 (s) ≥ 0, s1 ≥ 0, and si∗ ≤ C.
Now, let s ∈ Xn with s1 = max` s`. In this case, gSH1 (s) is defined as
gSH1 (s) =
∫ 1
0
∏
i≥2
(
1− si
s1
t
)
dt
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and
∂gSH1 (y, s−1)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=s1
=
∫ 1
0
∑
i≥2
si
s21
t
∏
j 6=1,i
(
1− sj
s1
t
)
dt ≥
∑
i≥2
si
s21
∫ 1
0
t
∏
j 6=1,i
(1− t)
cj
s1 dt
=
∑
i≥2
si
s21
∫ 1
0
t(1− t)
C−si
s1 dt =
∑
i≥2
si
(C − si + s1)(C − si + 2s1)
≥ C
(C + s1)(C + 2s1)
.
Using the definition of λSH1 (s) in (6), this last inequality implies that
λSH1 (s) ≤
(C + s1)(C + 2s1)
C
. (9)
Also, by applying the Bernoulli inequality at the RHS of the definition of gSH1 (s), we obtain
gSH1 (s) ≥
∫ 1
0
∏
i≥2
(1− t)
si
s1 dt =
∫ 1
0
(1− t) Cs1 dt = s1
C + s1
. (10)
Now, we have∑
i≥2 p
SH
i (s) + λ
SH
1 (s)∑
i≥2 p
SH
i (s) + λ
SH
1 (s) g
SH
1 (s)
≤ C
2 + (C + s1)(C + 2s1)
C2 + (C + s1)(C + 2s1) g
SH
1 (s)
≤ 2C
2 + 3s1C + 2s
2
1
C2 + s1C + 2s21
≤ 3. (11)
The two first inequalities follow by (9) and (10), respectively, and the last one is obvious since s1, C ≥ 0.
Now, the upper bound follows by Lemma 4.2 using (8) and (11).
The proof of the lower bound is much simpler.
Lemma 5.3. The liquid price of anarchy of the SH mechanism is at least 3.
Proof. It suffices to restrict our attention to the 2-player version of the mechanism. Let s ∈ X2 with s1 ≤ s2.
In this case gSH1 (s) =
s1
2s2
which implies that λSH1 (s) = 2s2. Since the SH mechanism belongs to class C, by
Lemma 4.3, we have that s ∈ eq(GSH(s, 1)). Using Lemma 6, we obtain
LPoA(SH) ≥ sup
s∈X2:s1≤s2
3s2
s2 + s1
= 3.
The proof is complete.
6 Two-player mechanisms
As we saw in Theorem 5.1, the Kelly mechanism has an LPoA of exactly 2 even in the case of two players.
In contrast, our lower bound of 3/2 for 2-player mechanisms in Theorem 3.1 seems to leave room for
improvements. Such improvements are indeed possible as we show with the mechanisms that we present
in this section. Interestingly, the E2-PYS mechanism that is defined in the following is also proved to have
optimal LPoA among all 2-player PYS mechanisms with concave allocation functions.
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Let β ≈ 1.792 be the solution of the equation
1
β
− 1
β
exp
(
− β
β − 1
)
=
1
2
and define mechanism E2-PYS to be the PYS 2-player mechanism that uses the allocation function
gE2-PYSi (s) =

1
β − 1β exp
(
− ββ−1 · sis3−i
)
si ≤ s3−i
β−1
β +
1
β exp
(
− ββ−1 · s3−isi
)
si > s3−i
for player i ∈ {1, 2} and (non-zero) signal vector s = (s1, s2). Due to the definition of β, E2-PYS is a well-
defined resource allocation mechanism and, moreover, E2-PYS belongs to class C: the allocation function
can be seen to be concave (see also Figure 3) and the payment function is, of course, convex. The LPoA
bound statement for E2-PYS follows.
Theorem 6.1. The liquid price of anarchy of the E2-PYS mechanism is β ≈ 1.792.
Proof. We will prove the theorem using Lemma 4.2. Let s ∈ X2. Due to Lemma 4.3, we have that
s ∈ eq(GE2-PYS(s, 1)). We distinguish between two cases. First, assume that s1 ≤ s2; in this case,
gE2-PYS1 (s1, s2) =
1
β
− 1
β
exp
(
− β
β − 1 ·
s1
s2
)
and
∂gE2-PYS1 (y, s2)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=s1
=
1
(β − 1)s2 exp
(
− β
β − 1 ·
s1
s2
)
.
Using (6), λE2-PYS1 (s) is defined as λ
E2-PYS
1 (s) = (β − 1)s2 exp
(
β
β−1 · s1s2
)
. Then, it can be easily verified
that2
pE2-PYS2 (s) + λ
E2-PYS
1 (s)
pE2-PYS2 (s) + λ
E2-PYS
1 (s) g
E2-PYS
1 (s)
= β. (12)
Now, assume that s1 > s2; in this case,
gE2-PYS1 (s1, s2) =
β − 1
β
+
1
β
exp
(
− β
β − 1 ·
s2
s1
)
and
∂gE2-PYS1 (y, s2)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=s1
=
s2
(β − 1)s21
exp
(
− β
β − 1 ·
s2
s1
)
.
2We remark that a preliminary analysis similar to the very first steps in the proof of Theorem 6.1 inspired the design of the
E2-PYS mechanism (as well as that of E2-SR mechanism that is defined later) at first place. By keeping the allocation function as
the unknown and requiring that the RHS of (6) is equal to some value α for all signal vectors s ∈ X2 with s1 ≤ s2, we obtained a
first-order differential equation which, using the appropriate conditions so that the resulting mechanism is valid, led to E2-PYS.
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Now, (6) yields λE2-PYS1 (s) =
(β−1)s21
s2
exp
(
β
β−1 · s2s1
)
. By substituting pE2-PYS2 (s), λ
E2-PYS
1 (s), and
gE2-PYS1 (s), we have
pE2-PYS2 (s) + λ
E2-PYS
1 (s)
pE2-PYS2 (s) + λ
E2-PYS
1 (s) g
E2-PYS
1 (s)
= β ·
1 + (β − 1)
(
s1
s2
)2
exp
(
β
β−1 · s2s1
)
β + (β − 1)2
(
s1
s2
)2
exp
(
β
β−1 · s2s1
)
+ (β − 1)
(
s1
s2
)2 ≤ β.
(13)
The inequality follows since the quantity at its left is decreasing in s1/s2 (its derivative with respect to s1/s2
can be shown by tedious calculations to be non-positive for s1/s2 ≥ 1) and, hence, it is upper-bounded by
its value for s1/s2 = 1; this is equal to β by its definition.
The theorem follows by Lemma 4.2 using (12) and (13).
We now show that E2-PYS has optimal LPoA among 2-player PYS mechanisms in class C. The proof
makes use of Lemma 4.2 and a simple differential inequality that involves the allocation function.
Theorem 6.2. Any 2-player PYS mechanism with concave allocation function has liquid price of anarchy
at least β ≈ 1.792.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, assume that there exists a PYS mechanism M that has liquid price of
anarchy β′ < β. Denote by f : R≥0 → [0, 1] the function defined as f(y) = gM1 (y, 1). Then, by applying
Lemma 4.2 with s = (y, 1) ∈ X2 to M we have λM1 (y, 1) = 1/f ′(y) and LPoA(M) ≥ 1+1/f
′(y)
1+f(y)/f ′(y) for
every y ∈ [0, 1]. By our assumption LPoA(M) ≤ β′, we get the differential inequality
(β′ − 1)f ′(y) + β′f(y) ≥ 1
for every y ∈ [0, 1]. Using Gro¨nwall’s inequality, f(y) is lower-bounded by the solution of the correspond-
ing differential equation. Due to the condition f(0) = 0, this yields
f(y) ≥ 1
β′
− 1
β′
exp
(
− β
′
β′ − 1y
)
and, hence,
1
2
= f(1) ≥ 1
β′
− 1
β′
exp
(
− β
′
β′ − 1
)
>
1
β
− 1
β
exp
(
− β
β − 1
)
,
which contradicts the definition of β. The last inequality follows since the function 1z − 1z exp
(
− zz−1
)
is
decreasing in [1, 2].
Let us now define a non-PYS mechanism that has considerably better LPoA than E2-PYS and almost
matches the lower bound of 3/2 from Theorem 3.1 for 2-player mechanisms. Let γ ≈ 1.529 be the solution
of the equation
1
γ
− 1
γ
exp
(
− γ
2(γ − 1)
)
=
1
2
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and define mechanism E2-SR to be the 2-player mechanism that uses the allocation function (see Figure 3
for a comparison of the allocation functions of Kelly, SH, E2-PYS, and E2-SR)
gE2-SRi (s) =

1
γ − 1γ exp
(
− γ2(γ−1) ·
(
si
s3−i
)2)
si ≤ s3−i
γ−1
γ +
1
γ exp
(
− γ2(γ−1) ·
(
s3−i
si
)2)
si > s3−i
and the payment function pE2-SRi (s) = si/s3−i for player i ∈ {1, 2} and (non-zero) signal vector s =
(s1, s2). Recall that we follow the general conventions from Section 2; hence, the payments are 0 when
some of the signals is equal to zero. Due to the definition of γ, E2-SR is a well-defined resource allocation
mechanism. However, observe that E2-SR does not belong to class C (the allocation function is not concave;
see Figure 3) and the condition s ∈ eq(GE2-SR(s, 1)) is not guaranteed to be satisfied. Next, we will prove
an upper bound on the LPoA of E2-SR. The proof follows in a very similar way to the proof of Theorem
6.1 with the exception that it does not provide a tight bound.
0 1
0
1/2
signal ratio
al
lo
ca
tio
n
Figure 3: A comparison of the allocation function gMi used by E2-PYS (in green), (the 2-player version
of) Kelly (in blue), SH (dashed), and E2-SR (in red) as a function of si/s3−i for si ≤ s3−i. Among these
mechanisms, E2-SR is the only one with a non-concave allocation function.
Theorem 6.3. The liquid price of anarchy of the E2-SR mechanism is at most γ ≈ 1.529.
Proof. We will prove the theorem by mimicking the proof of Theorem 6.1. Let s ∈ X2. We distinguish
between two cases. First, assume that s1 ≤ s2; in this case
gE2-SR1 (s1, s2) =
1
γ
− 1
γ
exp
(
− γ
2(γ − 1) ·
(
s1
s2
)2)
and
∂gE2-SR1 (y, s2)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=s1
=
s1
(γ − 1)s22
exp
(
− γ
2(γ − 1) ·
(
s1
s2
)2)
.
Also,
∂pE2-SR1 (y, s2)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=s1
=
1
s2
.
16
Using (6), λE2-SR1 (s) is defined as λ
E2-SR
1 (s) = (γ − 1) s2s1 exp
(
γ
2(γ−1) ·
(
s1
s2
)2)
. Then, it can be easily
verified that
pE2-SR2 (s) + λ
E2-SR
1 (s)
pE2-SR2 (s) + λ
E2-SR
1 (s) g
E2-SR
1 (s)
= γ. (14)
Now, assume that s1 > s2; in this case,
gE2-SR1 (s1, s2) =
γ − 1
γ
+
1
γ
exp
(
− γ
2(γ − 1) ·
(
s2
s1
)2)
and
∂gE2-SR1 (y, s2)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=s1
=
s22
(γ − 1)s31
exp
(
− γ
2(γ − 1) ·
(
s2
s1
)2)
.
The payment derivative is again equal to 1/s2 and (6) yields
λE2-SR1 (s) = (γ − 1)
(
s1
s2
)3
exp
(
γ
2(γ − 1) ·
(
s2
s1
)2)
.
By substituting pE2-SR2 (s), λ
E2-SR
1 (s), and g
E2-SR
1 (s), we have
pE2-SR2 (s) + λ
E2-SR
1 (s)
pE2-SR2 (s) + λ
E2-SR
1 (s) g
E2-SR
1 (s)
= γ ·
1 + (γ − 1)
(
s1
s2
)4
exp
(
γ
2(γ−1) ·
(
s2
s1
)2)
γ + (γ − 1)2
(
s1
s2
)4
exp
(
γ
2(γ−1) ·
(
s2
s1
)2)
+ (γ − 1)
(
s1
s2
)4 ≤ γ.
(15)
The inequality follows because the quantity at its left is decreasing in s1/s2 (its derivative with respect to
s1/s2 can be shown by tedious calculations to be non-positive for s1/s2 ≥ 1) and, hence, it is upper-bounded
by its value for s1/s2 = 1; this is equal to γ by its definition.
The theorem follows by Lemma 4.2 using (14) and (15).
Interestingly, a simpler 2-player mechanism that uses the allocation function of SH and the signal-ratio
payment function of E2-SR has a slightly worse LPoA of φ = 1.618. In fact, this bound is tight since this
particular mechanism belongs to class C. The proof is left as an exercise to the reader.
7 Open problems and extensions
Even though we have revealed an almost complete picture on the liquid price of anarchy of resource al-
location mechanisms, our work leaves an interesting open problem: is the 2 − 1/n bound achievable (as
opposed to 2), preferably by a simple mechanism? In particular, is there a mechanism with proportional al-
location function and appropriate non-PYS payments that achieves this LPoA bound? This question seems
technically challenging even for the case of two players only.
Regarding the liquid price of anarchy over more general equilibrium concepts (e.g., correlated equilibria)
or settings with incomplete information (and Bayes-Nash equilibria), is the Kelly mechanism still optimal
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within low-order terms? We are far from answering this question. Our previous paper [2] and the follow-
up paper by Christodoulou et al. [3] present LPoA bounds for Kelly, but these are not known to be tight.
We conjecture that the proof of tight LPoA bounds over more general equilibrium concepts for any resource
allocation mechanism should exploit the structure of worst-case games and equilibria as we did in the current
paper for pure Nash equilibria. Unfortunately, extending our characterization from Section 4 to more general
equilibrium concepts seems elusive at this point.
There are several interesting extensions of our setting that could be considered. Budget-aware mecha-
nisms, which have access to the budget value of each player, constitute a first such extension. Of course,
our analysis for mechanisms Kelly, SH, E2-PYS, and E2-SR carries over to this case. In contrast, our lower
bound (Theorem 3.1) is not true anymore. The proof constructs two games, in which almost every player has
different budgets. The main property we have exploited in that proof (for non-budget-aware mechanisms) is
that the strategic behavior of the players results in the same set of equilibria in both games. This argument
fails for budget-aware mechanisms; a small change in the budget of a single player could be enough to alter
the set of equilibria. So, in principle, one might hope even for full efficiency at equilibria (i.e., LPoA equal
to 1) in this case, analogously to the results of [16], [9], and [21] in the no-budget setting. Interestingly, our
next statement rules out this possibility.
Theorem 7.1. For n ≥ 2, every n-player budget-aware resource allocation mechanism has liquid price of
anarchy at least 4/3.
Proof. Let M be any n-player budget-aware resource allocation mechanism that uses an allocation function
gM and a payment function pM . Let s = (s1, ..., sn) be an equilibrium of the game GM1 induced by M for
players with valuations vi(x) = x for i ∈ {1, 2} and vi(x) = 0 for i ≥ 3, and budgets ci = 1 for every
i ∈ [n]. Assume that the allocation returned by M at this equilibrium is d = (d1, ..., dn). Without loss of
generality, we may assume that one of the first two players (say, player 1) gets a resource share of at most
1/2.
Recall that, for every signal vector y, the utility of any player i is defined as uMi (y) = vi(g
M
i (y)) −
pMi (y). Now, consider the game GM2 where player 2 has the modified valuation function v˜2(x) = 1+xwhile
all other players are as in GM1 ; the budgets are the same in both games and are known to the mechanism.
Observe that the modified utility of player 2 is now u˜M2 (y) = v˜2(g
M
2 (y))− pM2 (y) = uM2 (y) + 1. Hence,
s is an equilibrium in GM2 as well and M returns the same allocation d again.
Clearly, due to the definition of the valuation functions, the contribution of players i ≥ 3 in the liquid
welfare (in any state of the game) is zero. Hence, the liquid welfare at equilibrium is min{v˜1(d1), c1} +
min{v˜2(d2), c2} = d1 + 1 ≤ 3/2, while the optimal liquid welfare is equal to 2, achieved at the allocation
according to which the whole resource is given to player 1. We conclude that the liquid price of anarchy of
M is LPoA(M) ≥ LPoA(GM2 ) ≥ 4/3, as desired.
In spite of the lower bound in Theorem 7.1, whether budget-aware resource allocation mechanisms can
have an LPoA better than 2− 1/n is an important open problem. This seems to be a technically non-trivial
and extremely challenging task though.
Another possible extension of our setting could be to allow the players to declare their budgets to the
mechanism in addition to their scalar signal. Taking this approach to its extreme, one could imagine resource
allocation mechanisms which ask the players to submit multi-dimensional signals. At first glance, this seems
to lead to much more powerful mechanisms than the ones we have considered here. Surprisingly, this higher
level of expressiveness has no consequences to the LPoA at all and our lower bound of 2−1/n captures such
mechanisms as well. Indeed, by inspecting the two games used in the proof of Theorem 3.1, we can verify
that the same signal vector (no matter whether signals are single- or multi-dimensional) leads to the same
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allocation by the mechanism and the same strategic behavior of the players in both games. This observation
applies to the proof of Theorem 7.1 as well.
Finally, we believe that the liquid welfare is an appropriate efficiency benchmark for auctions with
budget-constrained players. The recent paper [1] studies the LPoA of simultaneous first-price auctions;
obtaining similar results for other auction formats (e.g., see [18] for a recent survey) is certainly important.
Needless to say, we do not expect that the liquid welfare is unique as a measure of efficiency in settings with
budgets. Defining alternative efficiency benchmarks and studying the price of anarchy with respect to them
would shed extra light to the strengths and weaknesses of auction mechanisms.
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